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"Les a - coups d'acceleration de l 1 histoire marquent la vie
des peuplescomrne les sacrements celle du chr~tien. Ces periodes extra
ordinaires soot aussi la biblioth~que ou, qui en a compris la grammaire,
peut lire a livre ouvert les lois du changement social profond" Serge
Christophe Kolm, La Transition Socialiste--La Politique Economique de Gauche,
Paris: Les Edition du Cerf, 1977.
"In the study of social phenomena, disorder is, it is true, the sole
substitute for the controlled experiments of the natural sciences. But
it sometimes happens that, in the midst of disorder, events move so
rapidly that we are not able properly to observe them; disorder may be
excessive even to the most detached of scientists." Frank D. Graham,
Exchange, Prices. and Production in Hyper-Inflation : Germany, 1920-23,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1930.

In the last few years, a unique combination of drastic internal and
external shocks has turned Portugal into a testing ground for social and
economic theories.

But the ground is dangerous; nations are not laborator

ies where the effects of different factors can be studied in isolation.

If

there are lessons to be learned from Portugal's experience, they must be
based on a theoretical framework which enables one to disentangle events in
which several forces operated simultaneously.
In this paper we present an interpretationo f the economic experience
of Portugal since the revolution.

We believe that the enduring consequence

of April 25 has been the transformation of Portugal into what one might call
a politicized market economy.

In any market economy prices of goods and

factors perform the dual role of allocating resources and determining the
distribution of incomes.

A politicized market economy is one in which tre

distributional role of prices becomes a justification for their manipulation,
but in which the allocative role of prices is not replaced by a centralized
allocation of quantities.

Examples of the resulting dilemma are present

even in relatively non-interventio nist countries:
EEC agricultural prices or U.S. oil prices.

e.g. the problems of

But in Portugal the dilemma
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has economy-wide consequence~ for the crucial politicized price is the price
of labor.
The real wage determines the distribution of income between capital
and labor, yet it is also a price determining supply and demand.

If the real

wage is left to the market, it may not settle at a level which.is regarded
as just; if it is set politically, it will not fulfill its allocative role.
The paper is organized as follows.

Section 1 gives some background

on Portuguese economic development before the revolution.

Section 2 develops

an analytical framework based on two "strategic variables"--output and the
real wage--whose evolution is analyzed in Sections 3 and 4 respectively.
Section 5 contains a brief conclusion.

1.

Background:

Portugal before 1974

In 1973 Portugal's economy was fairly typical of the group of middle
income nations sometimes referred to as newly industrializing countries or
"nics". 1

These countries were able to achieve rapid economic growth during

the 1960's and early 1970's via increased trade, exploiting their relatively
abundant supplies of semiskilled industrial workers in textbook fashion:
exporting labor-intensive manufactured goods, and also exporting labor
directly in the form of emigrant workers.

Portugal, with its 700,000

emigrant workers, relied more than most nics on direct export of labor,
but substantial exports of textiles, electronic components, and other labor
intensive manufactures had also emerged by the early 70's.
Table 1 presents some statistics on Portuguese economic growth
before 1974, with comparable statistics of Spain and Greece for comparison.
All three countries grew in somewhat similar fashion, so that these "soft

3

TABLE 1
Growth in Southern Europe Before 1974
Spain

Greece

7.4

5.8

7.5

Exports/GDP, 1968

24.2

13 .0

9.6

Exports/GDP, 1973

25.8

14 .3

14.2

Imports/GDP, 1968

29.2

15.6

18.2

Imports/GDP, 1973

33.2

15.6

25.2

Portugal
Rate of Growth of GDP
Per Capital, 1968-73

Source:

International Financial Statistics
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underbelly" countries form a natural group.

Several points stand out.

First, growth was quite rapid, with real GDP per capita growing at rates
which, if not up to South Korean or Taiwanese etandards, were still much
higher than less developed countries in general have managed.
growth was pro-trade biased.

Second,

In all of the countries exports and imports

rose relatively to gross domestic product; i.e., the economies became more
"open" as they grew.

In 1974-77 Portugal diverged from the others; Spain

and Greece continued to grow more open, while Portugal did not.
In saying that Portugal achieved fairly rapid growth, we are not
implying that all was for the best.

One problem with the economic develop

ment of Portugal is suggested if we notice that in qualitative terms
Portugal was moving into an economic relationship with respect to industrial
Europe similar to that of Puerto Rico with respect to the mainland of the
United States.

In other words, Portugal was becoming a dependent economy.

One need not interpret "dependence" in a Marxist way, certainly not in a
way that suggests that what was hap~~ning was economically bad for Portugal.
The problem was (and is) simply the fact that Portugal's economy is
strongly affected by economic policy decisions of the industrial countries,
decisions in which it has no voice.
The other problem with Portuguese growth was distributional.

While

it is probably true that nearly all Portuguese gained from growth, the
gains were distributed unequally, both between city and countryside, and
between the population at large and the elites which controlled economic and
political life.

There is little hard evidence on this, but Portugal by

1973 appeared to be a "dualistic" economy whose traditional sector had not
shared fully in growth.
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Despite these problems, it is difficult to avoid regardin2 the
Portuguese economy before 1974 as a successfu] one.

Portugal was still,

in 1973, a poor country;_but it was steadily catchinp un with the in
dustrial west.
This qualified success storv came to an abrunt eno in the fall
of 1973.

The oil embargo had a µarticularly strong effect on Portugal,

despite her claim on the abundant oil of Angola.

In February 1974 infla

tion shot up to over 30 percent at an annual rate, suuplies of some food
stuffs in Lisbon were disrupted, some white collar trade unions went on
strike and it was in a political vacuum that an 'Armed Forces ~fovement'-
of ambiguous economic ideolory--took power on April 25.
Suddenly, then, the Portu?-uese econo~v was subiectec. to a unioue
combination of shocks.

Political and social revolution at home, in

addition to its direct effects, triggered a massive return of settlers
from Africa.

At the same time the crisis in the world economy raised

the prices of imports, depressed the demand for exports, and provoked a
return of emigrant workers.
We will, once again, attempt to isolate a few crucial aspects of
these complex economic events.

We now turn to an explicit discussion

of the theoretical framework determining our choice of points to emphasize.
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2.

A Framework for Analysis
Our method in this paper will be to concentrate on two "strategic"

variables, the real wage rate and the level of output; or more precisely,
on output relative to potential and the real wage relative to its "warranted"
level, a concept which will be explained below,

Other aspects of Portugal's

economy will be considered either as affecting these strategic variables
or as being affected by them.

In other words, we will attempt to sort out

the tangle of events by first tracing the path of the strategic variables;
then working backward to the major causes of changes in these variables; and
finally moving forward to the effects of the changes.
The idea of concentrating on a few strategic variables is probably
worth justifying, although this is not the place for an extended method
ological discussion.

Our basic suppositions are that, while the number

of variables which have been subject to changes in recent years is large,
the number of variables which are of crucial policy importance is fairly
small.

At the same time, we suppose that some of these crucial variables

can be regarded as determined by the others, so that the structure of the
economy looks something like this:
Strategic
Variables

Exogenous
and Policy
Variables

>

Other
Crucial
Variables

where the strategic variables are thus both important in their own right
and the intervening variables through which other important variables are
determined.

Among the exogenous and policy variables we would put oil

prices, the exchange rate, government spending, and so on; the main crucial
but not strategic variables are the balance of payments, unemployment, and
the distribution of income,
The virtue of this scheme is that it lets us focus on a relatively
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limited number of channels of cause and effect.

The defect is, of course,

that it involves a simplificat ion, and may give a somewhat misleading
transparency to events.

However, when there are a few shocks as drastic

as those which Portugal has experienced , even very simple analysis can be
enlightenin g.
Let us begin, then, by discussing the crucial relationship s which we
believe obtain in the Portuguese economy.

First, and most obvious, is the

relationshi p between output and unemploymen t.

Other things equal, higher

output will mean higher employment, and there is some level of output which
corresponds to "full employment" (which includes allowance for some normal
level of unemploymen t).
Less often emphasized but also crucial is the relationshi p between
output and the real wage, on the one hand, and the current account of the
balance of payments on the other.

Clear!~ increasing output will swell the

demand for imports and, other things equal, worsen the balance of payments.
Holding output constant, an increase in the real wage will normally involve
increasing the price of domestic relative to foreign goods, so that there
will also be a negative effect of the real wage en the balance of payments.
When,for simplicity, the level of output consistent with full employ
ment is independent of the real wage, these relationship s can be illustrated
2
In the diagram, one axis measures X, the level
with a diagram like Figure 1.
of real output, while the other measures the real wage rate

w.

The vertical

line IB indicates the level of output consistent with full employment, while
the line XB indicates the combination s of real wage and real output consi~tent
with current account balance.

The diagram shows that, given full

employment output Y*, there is a unique level of the real wage W*, which is
consistent with external balance.

We will refer to W* and Y* as the "warranted"
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real wage and "potential" output.resp ectively.

They are the only levels of

Wand X which are consistent with equilibrium in both the labor and foreign
exchange markets.

Departures from these levels always involve a situation

of disequilibr ium--that is, a situation of economic or social stress.
The possible kinds of disequilibri um are illustrated by the "zones
of ~conomic unhappiness " surrounding the equilibrium point.

For each zone

the state of the labor market and of the balance of payments are indicated.
On the eve of the revolution Portugal was in a situation of tight labor

markets and payments surplus, i.e., it was in the southeastern zone of the
diagram.

Since late 1974 the characteris tic state of the economy has been

more like that in the northwest zone--persi stent unemployment and current
account deficits.
While a diagram like Figure 1 is of considerabl e diagnostic use, it
The

has some defects if one tries to use it to discuss events in Portugal.
problem is that the schedules have undoubtedly

shifted drastically .

For

example, the arrival of the returnees must, by increasing the supply of labor,
have increased potential output and reduced the warranted real wage.

In

order to trace out the path of the economy one would not only have

·- keep

track of W and X but of the shifting IB and XB schedules as well.

This

LU

would destroy the simplicity of the scheme.
What we will do to avoid this problem is replace W and X as our
variable by W/W* and X/X*:

that is, by the actual values relative to

their equilibrium values.

To a first approximati on, one would expect

the XB and IB schedules to remain unchanged when drawn in this space.
Thus the effect of, say, a rise in oil prices--redu cing the warranted
real wage-would be to raise W/W* for a given W, not to shift the XB
curve.

The variables W/W* and X/X* become our strategic variables, and the

starting point of our analysis is a story about their path over time which
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Fig ure 1
ines s"
The "Zo nes of EconotTlic Unh app

IB
w

Exc ess Sup ply
De fic it

Exc ess Demand
De fici t

Exc ess Sup ply
Sur plu s
Exc ess Demand
Sur plu s
XB

~x
L -- -- -- -- --X*-- -- -- -- --

makes sense of the observed economic developments.
This may be an appropriate place to say something about the "structural"
3
aspect of Portugal's economic difficulties. It is often argued that con
ventional macroeconomic analysis is not applicable to Portugal because the
problems are not primarily due to increases in real wages or domestic demand, but are rather the result of real shocks such as the rise in oil
prices and the loss of the colonies.

What this amounts to saying is that

in our Figure 1 the schedules have shifted; or, equivalently, in Figure 2
the movement of the economy has been due primarily to changes in W* and Y*.
In fact, we would agree that such "structural" changes have been large and
important.

But the attempt to use the cause of disequilibrium to determine

the remedy is a mistake.

Suppose that external shocks--such as an oil price

increase-were to lead to a combination of balance of payments deficit and
unemployment, the real wage having remained unchanged.
wage increases would not

Even though real

be the cause of disequilibrium, it would still be

the case that the real wage would have to fall to achieve internal and
external balance.

Whatever the cause of disequilibrium, conventional

macroeconomic analysis can still be used to determine the way back to
equilibrium.
Returning to the analytical framework, in Figure 2 we indicate
schematically the course we believe Portugal has followed since 1973.

In

1973 the Portuguese economy was in a situation of tight labor markets, as
shown by the low unemployment rate, and was running a current account
surplus; thus our starting point, as shown in Figure 2, is one of dis
equilibrium.

There followed a series of events which we would divide into

three phases, shown in our schematic as 1, 2, and 3.

11

Fiiwre 2
Three Phases of Macroeconomic Adjustment

IB

1-------------------- ---------~ X/X*
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(i)

Phase 1 (1974-75):

in output (in 1975 only).
moved into deficit.

There was a rise in real wages and a slump

Unemployment increased and the current account

Because of the oil price increase, the world recession,

and the increase in Portugal's labor force, th.e warranted real wage dropped
considerably.

The last factor may also have increased potential output.

Thus we suppose in Figure 2 that 1974-75 was marked by a sharp rise in W/W*,
as the numerator rose and the denominator fell, and also by a decline in

X/X*.
(ii)

Phase 2 (1976-77):

Under pressure from wage controls, devalu

ations, and the overhang of unemployed, real wages fell.
of credit produced rapid growth in output.

But an explosion

The effect of output expans.ion

was enough to worsen the external balance in spite of the decline in real
wages.
(iii)

Phase 3 (1978-

):

Real wages continued to decline; but

this was now accompanied by tightened credit, producing slower output growth.
As we show in Figure 2, the effect has been to move Portugal close
to external balance.
To explain why Portugal has followed this path requires a more de
tailed examination of events.

This is done in the next two sections:

Section

3 analyses the course of expenditure, output, and the capacity of the economy;
Section 4 discusses movements in real wages and their relationship to changes
in the equilibrium real wage rate.
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3.

Output ·
The evolution of output in Portugal since 1973 is summarized in

Table 2.

Until 1977 real gross domestic product in 1975 prices grew on an

average at a rate of 2.4% p.a., much less than the growth rates of the late
60's and early 70's but still above the comparable EEC figure of 1.8%.

As

is apparent from the table, however, the variability of Portuguese output
was also higher.
The figures for 1977 and 1978 are still first round official estimates
and some .earlier figures are included to show the precarious nature of these
estimates.

Ftrst-round official estimates of 1973-75 output available in

mid 1976 were substantially revised twice and led to underestimating the
strength of the 1976-77 recovery.

Forecasts have been even less reliable.

The best 1976 forecast for 1977 was a supoosedly "optimistic'' one which as
sumed a 10 percent increase in investment, regarded as extreme at the time.
Yet output growth was less than forecast.
The Plan forecast of growth for 1979 is 2.8 percent; given the
rise in oil prices and the downward revisions in estimates of OECD growth,
this is probably over-optimistic.
Chart 1 shows that the decline in the growth rate in 1974 and 1975
was also accompanied by a sharp fall in the share of output devoted to
investment.
output.

This obviously tended to reduce the rate of growth of potential

And the investment figure--which is in any case highly unreliable 4

--understates the problem.

A large part of capital formation in the post

1973 period has gone to public sector projects of questionable productivity,
particularly the immense Sines project.

The decline in private investment

is thus far larger than these numbers would suggest.

In 1976, for instance,

14

TABLE 2
Output Estimates
(million Contos)

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1.

Current prices GDP f.c.

254.2

309.0

342.1

422.6

563.8

715 .4

874 .8

2•

GDP m.p.

281.1

338.4

376.2

467.6

622.2

781. 9

953 .o

GDP m.p. 1975 prices
Estimated in
3.1 1979

388.8

393.2

376.2

402.0

423.4

437.1

3.2 1978

389.3

393.7

376.7

406.7

426.6

4. Forecast in
4.1 1976

377.8

389.0

373.5

390.3

408.0A
414.4B

383.3

397.4A
402.SB

3.

4.2 1977
Growth rates% p.a.
5.

Portugal

6.

EEC average

Sources:

11.9

1.1

-4.3

6.9

5.3

3.2

2.0

5.9

1.6

-1.5

5.0

2.3

2.8

3.2

1. a) 1973-76 Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (except for
construction in 1976. source lb)
b) 1977-78 Banco de Portugal and Departamento Central de
Planeamento
c) 1979 DCP forecast in Grandes Op5oes do Plano, 1979
2. a) 1973-78 same as above
b) Adjusted for 1978 collected indirect taxes and 1979 budget
with own estimate for subsidies based on same ratio to in
direct taxes as 1977.
3. IFS (line 99b.p) same as 2. with numbers from 1978 Banco
de Portugal Report for the 1979 estimate (corrected in August
1979 issue of IFS)and 1977 Report for the 1978 estim~te.
4.

Based on DCP numbers for 1973-75 and projection from model
in Abel et al. (1977) for 1976 forecasts and Abel and
Beleza (1978) for 1977 forecasts. Forecast A (pessimistic)
assumes constant investment, B (optimistic) assumes 10%
increase.

5.

From 3.1; 1979 OECD (1979c) forecast

6.

OECD (1979c)
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public (state) investmen t increased by 19 percent, whereas housing declined
by 6 percent and "producti ve" investmen t (itself mainly in the nationali zed
firms) declined by 6.7%, giving rise to the total decline of 3.4%.

In 1977

the 12% increase was more evenly spread between "producti ve" (13.3%) anc
public (14.6%) but housing continued to lag at 5.5%.

Plan figures show very

little growth in investmen t in 1978-79.
The effect was, apparentl y, a sharp reduction in the productiv ity
of investmen t.

A crude but suggestiv e indicator of this decline is the

gross increment al output-ca pital ratio, which was .41 in 1969-73 but only
.13 in 1974-5.

We should note, however, that this measure of the producti

vity of investmen t has declined world-wid e.

For example, in Japan it de

clined from .29 in the period 1967-73 to .12 in the post 73 period.

In

the U.K. the decline was from .17 to .05.
The swings in output in Portugal were also reflected in the crucial
balance of payments.

Table 3 shows the changes in that balance since 1973.

In 1973, as we have already mentioned , Portugal was in surplus.

The deteri

oration in the external environme nt produced an abrupt deteriora tion in the
trade balance.

Slump in 1975 temporari ly reduced the demand for imports,

but the boom of 1976-77 led Portugal into a severe deficit and forced the
adoption of austerity measures.
The dramatic reversal of the external deficit in 1Q7P was a definite
surprise.

A ma_;or part of the improveme nt was a sun1:e in er,ip-rants ' remit

tances, and it is possible that this was in part dishoardi n? of accumulat ed
savings held abroad as confidenc e in Portugal' s political stabilitv returned
and nominal interest rates on deposits were raised.

If this is the case.

remittanc es will fall again, so that part of the improveme nt will turn out
to be only temporary .

However, exports have also surred, indicatin ~ that
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Table 3
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(in millions of dollars)

(1)
TRADE

(2)
CURRENT ACCOUNT

NON MONETARY TRANSACTIONS

1973

-914

351

345

1974

-2002

-829

-638

1975

-1674

-819

-1016

1976

-2115

-1246

-1179

1977

-2533

-1500

-1437

1978

-2300

-775

157

- 276~

723**

1979

Notes:
Sources:

-740*

(3)

* Jan.-June
** Jan.-August
1973-1977

OECD

1978

Banco de Portugal

1979

Banco de Portugal and Cardoso (1979)
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thPrL has heen a fundame ntal improvem ent in competi tiveness .
The r.xternal current account is related to nationa l saving by
the identity saving~ investm ent+ current account.

It is natural , then

to consider along with the current account the public sector deficit,
which is a major source of dissavin g, as is evident from Tahle 4.

In fact,

since investme nt has been so predomi nantly undertak en by the public sector,
the overall deficit of the public sector is the appropr iate measure of the
gap between private savings and private investm ent, where nationa lized
firms are included in the private sector.
Chart 2 shows a remarkab ly close relation ship between the externa l
current account and the public sector borrowin g requirem ent, measured in
dollars .

The surprisi ng turn of the externa l account in 1978-9 is again

evident there, since the availab le evidence suggests a substan tial worsenin g
of the puhlic sector deficit.
In output and expendi ture, then, Portuga l experien ced some sizeable
fluctuat ions.

These fluctuat ions were somewhat larger than those of other

European countrie s, and the balance of payments problem has been severe.
~onethe less, Portuga l has not been too far out of line with the experien ce
of other semi-in dustrial ized countrie s.

What makes the Portugue se experien ce

unique is the developm ents in the labor market,
Portuga l in 1973 was a country with an unusuall y high proporti on of
its populati on working outside the country.
of employed Portugue se in 1975.
halted and partiall y reversed .

Emigran t workers were 17.57,

When recessio n came to Europe, emigrati on
At the same time, the returnee s began
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Table

4

PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTS
(in million contos)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
Central Administration

Current
Balance

Overall
Balance

Budget (OGE)

1973

9.0

2.6

5.2

-2.4

1974

1.2

-7.0

8.1

-9.7

1975

-9.3

-18.5

-13.9

-25.4

1976

-13.0

-32.9

-31.8

-38.7

1977

-12.6*

-45.5*

-59.9

-49.0*

1978

-28.5*

-79.3*

-60.5

-76.6*

-66.0

n.a.

-120.0

n.a.

1979**A-12
B n.a.
*
**

-6~
-113.0

Balance (CGE)

Estimates
Forecasts

Sources:

1973-76 Estatisticas das Financas Publicas
1977-78 Banco de Portugal using data from Ministerio cias Financas
1979: A OECD (1979b,p • .>4).
B Revised official forecast for (3) Expresso, 10/13i79 and
June ratio (2)/(3) as in B.
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Chart 2
Current Account and Public Sector Deficit
(million dollars)
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arriving from Africa.

The result is shown in Table 5:

there was a huge

growth in the labor force, some 13 percent from 1973 to 1977, according
to the only available estimate (source A).
Because of the growing labor force, and because employment grew only
slightly, unemployment rose to very high levels.

(We are not confident in

these figures, for reasons discussed in Section 4).
between actual and potential output.
output and the output gap in Table 6.

A gap thus emerged

We make an effort to measure potent~al
Several assumptions are made.

First,

we assume that potential employment is 97 percent of the labor force:

i.e.,

that the 3 percent unemploymen t of 1973 represents "full employment" .
Second, we assume that the ratio of the marginal productivit y of labor to
average productivity is one-half, based on the 1973 labor share.

Thus we

compute "full-employ ment" employment as 97 percent of total labor force, and
assume that the additional workers would have one-half of the average product
of those already employed.
The numbers produced by this rough calculation show a large output
gap, only slightly narrowed by the 1977 boom.

While the output gap is

large, however, even closing it completely would still leave the growth
rate of per capita GDP since 1973 quite low.

In other words, potential

output has grown slowly given the rise in the population.
for this is the slow growth in productivit y.

The chief reason

From 1973 to 1978 GDP per

employee rose 10%, an annual growth rate of only 1.9%.

This is, of course,

the counterpart of the low output-cap ital ratio already mentioned.

5

On balance, then, averaging over the fluctuation s, output has £siled
to keep up with potential, while potential output has in turn gro"Wn disap
pointingly slowly.
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Table 5
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
(Thousands)
(1)
Employment
A

B

C

(2)

(3)

Unemployment

Civilian Labour Force

A

B

C

A

B

C

1973

3046

n.a.

n.a.

99

n.a.

n .a.

3145

n.a.

n.a.

1974

3061

3767

3621

180

86

47

3241

3853

3668

1975

2980

3735

3714

396

222

133

3376

3957

3847

1976

3005

3820

3759

504

276

244'

3509

4096

4003

1977

3097

3781

3787

455

326

291

3552

4107

4078

1978

n.a. 3809

3736

450*

348

319

n.a.

4157

4055

Note:

(1) • (3) - (2)

Sources:

A - Gabinete de Escudos, Planeamento e Organiza~ao, Ministry of
•
Labour as reported by Banco de Portugal
B - INE, 1st. semester survey as reported in Banco de Portugal
C - INE, 2nd. semester survey as reported by Banco de Portugal

*as reported in BPA, Conjuntura, n°12.
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Table 6
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND THE O[TPLTT rAP

1973
1.

Unemployment(%)

2.

Output Gap(%)

3.

Potential Output 389.0
(million contos)

Sources:

(1) -

3.1
.05

1973-77:
197~:

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

5.6

11. 7

14.4

12.8

13.0*

1.88
400.6

4.93
394. 7

6.66
428.8

5.62
44 7 .2

Table 5, Source A (1- (2)/(3) x 100.

reported in OECD (1979b) fro~ Source A.

(2)

(((1) - 3.0)/(100-(1)))

(3)

((3) from Table 2, lin~ 3.1.) x (1 + (2)/100)

X

.5

5.75
462.2
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3.

Real Wages
The movements in the real wage rate in Portugal, and the changes in

the distribution of income which accompanied these movements, are perhaps
the most striking feature of economic developments since. 1973.

As is shown

in Table 7, Portuguese real wages rose sharply in the first eighteen months
following the revolution, then began an extraordinary decline which left
them, by 1978, well below their pre-revolution level.
problems with the figures, as discussed below).

(There are-once again-

The labor share in

national income paralleled this movement, although the rise in the labor
share from 1973 to 1975 was much larger in percentage terms than the rise
in real wages, so that in 1977 the labor share was still substantially above
its 1973 level.
As we have already suggested, however, the crucial variable from the
point of view of achieving internal and external balance is not the wage rate
.£!!_~but the wage rate relative to its ''warranted" or equilibrium level.
While the warranted real wage rate is not directly observable, there can
be little question that it fell sharply in the first two years following the
revolution, for reasons discussed below.

Thus, the ratio of the actual to

the warranted real wage must have risen more steeply than the real wage it
self.

Where that ratio now stands is a difficult question which we will

postpone to the end of this section.
Let us begin by discussing the factors affecting the movement of
real wages since 1973.

We will then turn to a consideration of the factors

which must have affected the warranted real wage, making an effort to put
at least an order of magnitude on the movements in this variable.

Finally

we will discuss the implication of the movements in both variables.
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Table 7

REAL WAGES AND THE TERMS OF TRADE

1.
2.
3.

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

Real Wage
(1973 = 100)

100

106

109

101

91

89

Labor Share
in Income (%)

51.6

57 .0

68.9

66.6

60.0

56.4

Terms of Trade
(1973 = 100)

100

89.9

76.8

73.2

74. 9

76

S01.1rces:

1: IFS
2,3: World Bank (1978).
1: INE, Boletim Mensal
2, 3: Banco de Portugal

1973-77:
1978:
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Causes of Changes in Actual Real Wages
Since 1973 wages in Portugal have been largely a political
phenomenon.

The political climate affects wage settlement directly through

its impact on bargaining and on public sector wage decisions.

At the same

time, government policy plays an important role in determining real wages
through wage and price controls, taxation, and exchange rate policy.

Market

forces do have some effect, especially in the small-business sector.

But

the principal way that economic pressures affect real wages is by inducing
the government to take action to push real wages towards a level which it
regards as appropriate.
In 1974-75 the internal situation in Portugal naturally made for
intense pressure for real wage increases, while the "war chest•; of foreign
exchange and gold left by the old regime allowed the successive governments
to ignore external constraints for the time being.
a sizable list of factors making for wage increases.

large increases in the minimum wage.

One can easily draw up
First, there were

Second, wages paid by the government

-both in the traditional public sector and in newly nationalized firms--were
sharply increased.
~

Third, legal restrictions which were placed on dismissals

facto forced firms to continue paying the wages of striking workers,

with obvious effects on the balance of power in wage bargaining.

Even

the threat of bankruptcy was not much of a limitation, since loss-making
firms were often able to get low-interest loans--in effect subsidies--to
cover their wage bills.

Finally, the political climate itself made for worker

militancy and employer timidity.
We should note that in addition to a redistribution of income from
capital to labor there was a redistribution within the labor force to
the less well-paid.

In particular, changes in the tax system would have
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made it necessar y for higher-p aid workers to have received much larger
percenta ge wage increase s to· keep up with inflatio n than those with lower
initial wages, as shown by the figures reproduc ed in Table 8.
The fact that nominal wage increase s were in part translat ed into
real increase s, instead of merely being dissipat ed in inflatio n, was also
largely due to policy.

For one thing, many prices were controll ed under

an elabora te system institut ed in 1974.

This system kept cost increase s from

being fully passed on in many areas, especia lly in rents.

Price controls

were supplem ented by subsidie s used to keep down the prices of some consump
tion staples.

And import prices were kept down by thP. Bank of Portuga l's

s~pport of the escudo,
With all of these forces working to raise real wages, it, is some
what surprisi ng that the real wage index reported in Table 7 did not rise
more.

In part this may reflect the unrelia bility of the statisti cs,~ but
)

there were also some factors working to depress real wages, notably increase s
in taxation and the worsenin g of Portuga l's terms of trade.

These factors

are consider ed in our discussi on of movements in the warrante d real wage,
below.
From 1976 on many of the policies which had fostered real wage in
creases in 1974-75 were reversed .

A catalogu e of major actions would in

clude the followin g:
(i)

Ceilings were placed on wage increase s.

(ii)

Controll ed prices were raised.

(iii)

The escudo was repeated ly devalued .

(iv)

Subsidie s were reduced and taxes increase d.

(v)

Labor laws were changed so as to allow dismiss als.
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Table 8
CONSTANT

Equivalent nominal gross wage
(contos/month)

REAL TAKE HOME·

PAY

% share in increase

1974

1979

Inflation

Tax

4

12.2

86.5

13.5

8

25.8

79.8

20.2

15

55.7

65.3

34. 7

30

267.7

22.3

77. 7

Source:

" do Atlantico, Conjuntura, 12,
Banco Portugues
July 1979

Note:

See also Cadilhe

- Costa (1978)
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(vi)

The interest rates on loans to loss making firms were increased.

In addition to these policy actions, there was pressure on the wage
rate from the overhang of unemployed workers, swollen by returnees from
Africa and the halting of emigration to Western Europe.
The most obvious way in which policy affected the real wage rate is,
of course, through devaluation.

Devaluation--if it is effective--has the

effect of lowering the wage rate in terms of external prices.

This in

turn implies a fall in the real wage in terms of imports and other tradable
goods.

Chart 3 shows the Portuguese real wage in terms of external prices,

as measured by a weighted average of the four principal trading partners,
and in terms of the domestic CPI.

It is clear that the large decline in

the "external" real wage must have playe~ an important role in the decline
of real wage in terms .of consumption goods.
What is surprising about the post-1976 period is how severe the de
cline in real wages has been. 7 The greater part of this decline took place
UTider a socialist government, in a country where trade unions remain powerful.
To make sense of the remarkable decline, we must consider the factors affecting
the warranted real wage.
Causes

.2.!_ Changes in the Warranted

~

Wage

Since we cannot directly observe the warranted real wage, it is
necessary to attempt to infer it from indirect evidence.
two kinds.

This can be of

First, the nature of the disequilibrium a country finds itself

in can be an indication of the position of the actual relative to the
warranted real wage.

If, for example, a country finds itself

oscillating

between unemployment and balance of payments deficits, this is an indication
that the actual real wage exceeds the warranted.

Second, one can attempt to

30
Chart 3
Internal and External Real Wage
(1973=100)
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take accoun t of the main factors which are likely to have affecte d the.
warran ted wage.

We will concen trate first on the second approac h.

The factors affecti ng the warran ted real wage may he divided into
two groups.

The more importa nt group is the set of "extern al" shocks in

1973-75 which were not under the contro l of policy:

the rise in oil prices,

in
the onset of econom ic stagna tion in indust rial countr ies, anc-1 the growth
the lahor force.
actions :

Probab ly less importa nt but still signifi cant were policy

increas es in indirec t taxes and in Social Securit y contrib utions.

let us start with the externa l shocks.

The worsen ing in the inter

nation al environ ment had the effect of reducin g the real income of the.
Portugu ese nation as a whole, and therefo re presum ably of reducin g the
warran ted real wage,

The size of this effect was quite large:

as shown

to
in Ta~le 7, Portug al's terms of trade worsene d by 24 percen t from 1973
a re
107R, which given the 1973 import share in GDP of 33 percen t implies
duction in real nation al purcha sing power of about 8 percen t.
At the same time, returne es and returni ng emigra nt worker s from Western
Europe swelled the labor force by

about

13

percen t.

Since the capita l

tion
stock was not increas ed accord ingly-- indeed , the period since the revolu
has been marked by low investm ent--th e fall in the capital -labor ratio
must also have acted to depress the equilib rium real wage.
Along w1th these extern al shocks came certain governm ent actions which
acted to further lower the warran ted real wage,

The most easily measur able

iture
of these were the increas es in indirec t taxes, from 13 percen t of expend
ts
in 1973 to 15 percen t in 1978, and the increas e in Social Securit y paymen
from 11 to 15 percen t of labour income.

Both of these widened the "wed~e"

of
between the price of output and the remune ration receive d by factors
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Can we estimate the impact of these factors on the warranted real
wag.e?

There are a number of obstacles to any such calculation.

there are the measurement difficulties:
can be considered reliable.

First,

not one of the crucial numbers

Secon~ there are technical difficulties arising

from possible changes in the equilibrium share of wages in factor payments.
If imports are a better substitute for capital than labor, the worsening
in the terms of trade would tend to raise the equilibrium labor share (and
conversely); the extent to which an increasing labor force lowers the equili
brium real wage depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor.
The best we can do is to make a hypothetical calculation, which will
give some indication of the order of magnitude of the effects.
lation is presented in Table 9.

Such a calcu

We must emphasize that the assumptions on

which the calculation is based are extremely shaky; the true number could
easily be

considerably more or less than our number.

So as not to give

a spurious impression of precision, we deal only in round numbers.
The first entry is the effect of the decline in the terms of trade.
Here we assume that the proportional reduction in the warranted real wage
is the same as the proportional reduction in real national purchasing power
as a whole.

The entry which follows is the effect of the 13 percent increase

in the labor force.

Two assumptions are made here:

(i) The elasticity of

substitution between capital and labor is taken to equal one, so that the
8
equilibrium share of labor did not change; (ii) We use the 1973 labor share

of one-half as a measure of the elasticity of output
input.

with respect to labor

The result,then, is an estimate of 6 percent for the effect on the

warranted real wage.

The effects of tax increases, shown by the remaining

entries, add a further~ percent.

1.
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Table 9

HYPOTHETICAL CALCULATION OF DECLINE IN WARRANTED REAL WAGE, 1973-78
Decline in terms of trade

8

Labor force growth

6 Percent

Increase in indirect taxes

2 Percent

Increase in Social Security payments

4 Percent

Total
Less:
r.quals:

Percent

2n Percent

Productivity increase
Decline in warranted real wage

Decline in actual real wage from Table 7

10 Percent

10 Percent
11 Percent
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erate
What is itmne diatel y appar ent is that, witho ut any delib
a quite large
inflat 1on of the figur es, we are able to come up with
number for the declin e in the warra nted real wage.

In fact, if we are

wage, this
conce rned with the ratio of the actua l to the warra nted
of W/W* was
calcu lation sugge sts that the declin e in the denom inator
morP impor tant in 1973- 75 than the rise in the nume rator.

We must

a sugge stive
repea t, howev er, that what we have done here is purel y
le estim ate.
calcu lation , not somet hing which can be treate d as a reliab
for-a ll decli ne
The shock s we have consi dered must have led to a oncein the equil ibrium real wage.

One would expec t this to be offse t over time

wage.
by the norma l, secul ar growt h in the equil ibrium real

There are some

case, howev er.
reaso ns for being pessi misti c about this in Portu gal's

First ,

y growt h world wide.
the years since 1973 have been marke d by low produ ctivit
1973 than befor e
Secon d, Portu gal has had lower growth in inves tment since
n 3, been devot ed
-and much of the inves tment has, as discu ssed in Sectio
Final ly, the insti 
to publi c secto r proje cts of doubt ful produ ctivit y.
had at least the
tution al chang esbro ughtb y the revol ution have proba bly
initi al effec t of hinde ring produ ctivit y growt h.

This is certa inly true

ed firms .
in agric ultur e, and may also be true for the natio naliz
h in
We can get a rough estim ate of the actua l secul ar growt
ctivit y.
the warra nted real wage by lookin g at actua l labor produ

Our

yee increa sed
prefe rred estim ate in Sectio n 3 was that GDP per emplo
10% from 1973 to 1978.

But we suspe ct this may be too high.

Offic ial

contr adicto ry"
data on emplo yment are "very hetero geneo us and parti ally
(as gener ously descr ibed by the OECD).

Growi ng employment in family
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enterp rises, self-em ployme nt, and public admini stratio n has surely been
.

unders tated.

9

Unless GDP is compar ably unders tated (which is also possi-

ble) the produc tivity growth is exagge rated.

In any case, even if \.:e

the
use the 10% estima te, we find that secular growth is much less than
impact decline in the warran ted real wage.
The implica tion of this is that the warran ted real wage is probabl y
te.
still, in 1979, below its 1973 level; 10 percent below, by our estima
What this means for the approp riatene ss of the actual real wage is the
next questio n.
The Curren t Situati on
Data for 1978 shows a real wage in Portuga l down about 20 percen t
from its 1975 peak.

At the same time, the disequ ilibrium state of the

ted
economy seemed to sugges t that the real wage was still above its warran
level.

That is, there was still some balance of paymen ts disequ ilibrium

in
(perhap s more than the curren t account indicat ed, since as pointed out
Section 3 some of the surge in emigra nts' remitta nces may be tempor ary),
togeth er with high unemplo yment.
As we have seen, given the size of the shocks which have affecte d
Portug al, it is possib le that the real wage is still too high to allow
simulta neous balance of paymen ts equilib rium and full employm ent.

It is

too soon to judge, howeve r; we may be witness ing delayed effects of the
earlie r period of high real wages.
In any case, there is no reason to believe that the real wage is
curren tly very far from its warran ted level.

Indeed, if one compare s

ed
our estima te of the decline in the warran ted real wage with the estimat
Given the

actual decline one sees that the two are almost exactly equal.
roughn ess of our method s, howeve r, t~i9 9ee1!1in~ exeeti t"u~ei 1 a
embara ssing coincid ence.

111.

"'i 1,n v
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5.

Ar Ass~ssm0nt

. In the years since April 25th, the realistic alternatives availa
ble to successive Portuguese governments have all been unpleasant.

For

the short run, the choice has always been between cutting real wages, in
creasing unemvloyment, and running a balance of payments deficit.

As re

serves have been drawn down and foreign indebtedness has grown, the last
option has become increasingly difficult to manabe.

So the last five years

h;,ve l-ieen marh,J by a narrowing of already binding constraints.
rhe eventual direction of Portuguese policy has thus been deterrninec by the logic of the situation.

Recent improvements in the

external balance notwithstanding , the balance of payments constraint
still precludes any sustained increase in either real wages or employ
ment.
Given the constraints on policy, d.etails of demand management are
not of central importance.

The actual record on stabilization is mixed.

Ir 1074-75, aJthough the slump in Portugal was deeper than in the rest of
E·:rope, this is not surprising given the severity of the internal and exter
nal shocks.

Ir fact Portugal did remarkably well: the actions of the govern

ment, even though not consciously planned, acted to support demand and limit
the initial d~age.
That in 1976--77, the demand expansion, and in particular consumption
and public investment surge, were larger than in the industrial countries,
despite the overhang of the 1Q74-75 disturbances, was also in part the result
of lack of a consistent policy, but this time was clearly inappropriate.
Indeed this expansion dissipated the remnants of the "war chest" and pushed
Portugal dc>eper into debt. eliminating the country's remaining room for maneu
ver.

More seriously, the implementation of poorly conceived investment
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projects in the public sector did not improve the country's -prospect s for
long term growth.
The austerity program agreed upon with the IMF in :fay 1978 harl
thus to be more stringent than would have been the case, had it been
implement ed by the first constitut ional governmen t in the summer of
1Q76.

Also, with rising private savings, the diversion of these

savings to financing the risinr, deficits of the public sector and state
the enterpris es has probably become a major cause of continuin g inadeqac·
of private investmen t; an inadequac y which is an important hraJ.·c on
the growth of potential output and of the warranted real :vase. ·
Real wages are at the heart of Portug~l' s ~xperienc e in recent
years.

In 1974-75 a huge gap opened between the actual and the warranted

real wage.

Then an extraordin ary decline in real wages set in. pro~ahly

closing this gap.

The downwarr l.flexibili ty of real wages in post-revo lu

tion Portugal is remarkabl e; the far smaller declines in the early 1970's
may have been a cause of the revolutio n.

However, the fall of the 4th

constitut ional governmen t in June 1979 has been linked to the announcem ent
of an extraordi nary tax on labor income, which suggests that the downward
flexibili ty may have a floor.
What can be learned from Portugal' s experienc e?

Perhaps the main

lesson is in the "narrow limits of the possible" when one tries to re
distribut e income in a market economy.

The allocativ e effects of disequili 

brium real wages, manifesti ng themselve s in a critical balance of payments
problem, forced governmen ts of pro-worke r sympathie s to engineer a steep
decline in workers' standard of living.

The dilemma of the politicize d

market economy could only have been eliminate d by going over to a centrally
planned economy.

But this would have other and we believe far worse

political and economic consequen ces.
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FOOTNOTES
1 oECD (1979a) lists as members of the group of newly industria lizing
countries the following nations: Greece, Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavi a
in -southern Europe; Brazil and Mexico in Latin America; and Hong Kong,
Singapore , South Korean and Taiwan, in Asia. Note that the grouping
together of these countries is not meant to deny the significa nt dif
ferences in the growth process between, say, the "Gang of Four" in Asia
and the southern European nations.
')
4

This diagram draws on the well-know n analysis by Swan (1960), as well
as the recent discussio n by Modiglian i and Padoa-Sch ioppa (1977).
Allowing for a positive effect of the real wage on output would not
change the analysis.

3
stallings (1979) emphasize s this aspect.
4

Portugues e estimates of fixed investmen t are based on sales of construction materials . Since administr ative backlogs led to lax enforceme nt
of building codes in this early post-revo lution period, the compositi on
of these sales changed, making estimatio n a hit-or-mi ss affair. Changes
in stocks are estimated by even less reliable guesswork .

5Productiv ity calculate d in this way diverges from the esti~ates
reported by the Banco de Portugal. In the 1977 Report, the growth,
productiv ity for 1976 and 1977 above was 11~. The 1976 figure, however,
was 7.1? in the 1977 Report and 3.4~~ in the 1976 Report. See further
estimates in Macedo (1979, p. 232, note 61).
6Tous the official figures for 1978 wage and price inflation are based
on average annual earnings in manufactu ring including social security
payments and the new price index on the Continent whereas the series
used in Table 7 line 1 and Chart 3 are the old indices of hourly wages
and the Lisbon CPI including rent reported in IFS. The 1978 increase
in the latter wage and price indices is 11% and 13% respectiv ely, whereas
the increase in the former is 18% and 21% respectiv ely. The use of
the Lisbon industria l wage index underestim ates return to labour be
cause both the Oporto industria l wage index and the agricultu ral index
are higher, on the other hand the use of the Lisbon CPI including rent
underestim ates inflation . A weighted average of real wages in agricul
ture, men and women, Lisbon and Oporto using the respectiv e CPI's
(without rent) just about matches the one in Table 7, except in 1976
and 1977 where the values are 4 and 3 percentag e points higher respectiv ely.
7The levelling -off of growth in the internal real wage before 1974
suggests a ''rising expectati ons" story of the Portugues e revolutio n,
a hypothesi s which has been advanced in the psycholog y and politics
literatur e, namely by Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970). The inverted
J shape of the real wage series after 1974 is used by Kolm (1977)
Figure 1 p. 35 as a revelatio n of the effects of a political victory
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of the right followi ng a politic al victory of the left in the cases
of Chile and Portug al. The effect of the externa l shocks is howeve r
ced
crucia l. Notice that the extern al real wage has a much more pronoun
J pattern .
8

Estima tes of the elastic ity of substit ution between capita l and labor
have been made for Portug al by Sousa (1977) and Barbosa (1977). Sousa's
estima te was 0.6; Barbos a's 0.8. In assumin g a value of 1, we are
biasing our results toward an underst atemen t of the decline in the
warran ted real wage.

9

(1979b , p. 10). The three sources indicat ed in Table 5 are not
compar able with each other. Sources Band C, which are now the only
,
ones used by Banco de Portug al begin in 1974 (See I~{E, Boletin Mensal
not
are
1978
for
A
source
1979 no4,sup plemen t) and the values of
directl y availab le. These values are close to the ones indicat ed
by Moura (1979, Table 4) which include agricu lture and public sector
even though (OECD 1979b, p. 11 footno te 10) claims that the Minist ry
of Labour poll exclude d these sectors .
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